Introduction
The focus of much of the literature on global (resource) governance has been on new policies and institutions, and their effectiveness (cf. Wilkinson and Weiss 2015; Haufler 2010) . Critical literature has stressed the resistance to seemingly well-intentioned liberal global governance. It has also tended to focus on repressive and productive technologies of liberal governance and their (unintended) effects. Both has been brought together in critical analyses of external governance and resistance as intertwined. Thus dissent is not only helped but importantly contained through transnational rights-based discourses, and agendas of participatory governance and community engagement (Colàs 2002 , Coleman and Tucker 2011 , Richmond 2011 , but see also Ryan 2015; also Huysmans and Nogueira 2016, 2, 12 and Lisle 2016, 14) .
Schemes for responsible business governance in particular thwart meaningful voice, participation and dissent by those corporate social responsibility (CSR) claims to serve. CSR opens up, in some instances, opportunities for concerned and affected populations to contest (resource) governance. However, companies that commit to CSR also control contestation in new ways. What appears as increased opportunity for critique and citizen participation is interwoven with subtle ways of 'disciplining dissent' (Coleman and Tucker 2011) .
Attention to indirect ways of 'conducting the conduct' (Rose and Miller 2008) of potential contenders has, until now, mainly focused political technologies that operate through programmatic discourse, disseminated through air-conditioned offices, by government officials, the discharging of order-making to brokers and intermediaries that works through an assymetric distribution of benefits and cooptation. More attention is required to how transnational liberal governance relies on clientelist means for containing dissent.
While different modes of indirectly disciplining dissent in transnational (resource) governance co-exist and are intertwined, the aim here is to distinguish them analytically and illustrate each in the first place. For so doing, I draw on Emmanuel Terray's (1986) metaphors of 'airconditioned' and 'veranda' politics. Air conditioned politics are named after the conference rooms and offices in which much of official politics take place that are built on claims to bureaucratic rationality, technocratic efficiency and democratic principles (Ibid., .
Applied to transnational governance and its contestation, this is for instance when NGOs articulate dissent by writing letters and reports to governments, donor organizations or multinational companies; in response the latter may justify their doings, convene meetings to explain their policies, or discuss measures of redress. 'Air conditioned politics' as used here thus likens the enactment of the liberal idea of civil society as separated from, but interacting with Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
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and checking on, rational-bureaucratic politics. Much Foucauldian critique of how dissent is disciplined in transnational governance rightly revolves around how these politics have powerful, disciplinary effects, well beyond the office.
While important, this tends to overlook the 'veranda politics' of transnational governance, which revolve around practices of transnational clientelism. Terray describes veranda politics as driven by a distinct logic: that of 'partage' (p. 38), best translated perhaps as 'sharing'. He derives the idea from ethnographic work on practices of governing in Côte d'Ivoire, of which many revolved around stabilizing order through distributing things among factions, in this case along religious, ethnic and regional lines. These practices were particularly visible on the verandas of influential office holders, thus the metaphor. In other contexts, it may be the airport lounge, the meeting room, or specific hours in the very same office in which air-conditioned politics take place. Since poor people rarely have access to formal political institutions and to public goods provided by the state, access to collective goods provision depends upon networks of access built around intermediaries (Chatterjee 2004; Hönke and Müller 2018) . These contain reciprocal but asymmetric personal relationships through which access to welfare and other goods is distributed, and provide subtle yet effective means of preventing contestation and engineering social peace.
1 How such clientelism is used and (re)produced by external actors, and disciplines dissent to transnational governance, is required more systematic attention.
1 They can also be powerful resources for mobilizing protest (see Auyero et al. 2009 ).
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After a discussion of transnational governance and the idea of disciplining dissent, the article uses research on transnational resource governance and contentious politics around multinational mining companies in hugely diverse contexts (Tanzania, DRC, South Africa), in order to develop and illustrate its key arguments. 2 Methodologically focussing on "specific practices of power at their point of application" (Death 2013, 763) , the next section traces how dissent is disciplined in air-conditioned politics. The following turns to the disciplining of dissent through transnational veranda politics. The article ends with a discussion of the implications of the argument for research on global governance and resistance.
Transnational governance and the disciplining of dissent
How protest is contained with repression has been demonstrated at length by students of contentious politics (e.g. McAdam and Snow 1997; Goldstone and Tilly 2001 Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
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However, Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian work has insisted that neither such engagement nor resistance operate outside of power relations. Governance schemes that stress development, community participation and work with civil society can depoliticize contentious issues as they get turned into technical problems. Or they may contribute to delegitimize dissent as criminal, such as when the 'street politics' (Bayat 1997) of claiming access to streets, markets or mineral resources become framed as 'illegal', and therewith criminal, not political problems. The very discourse of engagement encourages certain forms of political expression while discouraging others. At the same time, this literature has argued that contestation of global governance may ultimately stabilize and reproduce the existing order rather than challenging it (Colàs 2002; Neumann and Sending 2010, 110-131; Coleman and Tucker 2011) . It is the disciplined nature of much dissent that renders it particularly susceptible to the reproduction of power relations, which this article examines in more detail.
In the case of extractive industries, human rights and CSR discourses have changed over recent years how a number of companies (and governments) deal with protest. Hönke (2013, 7) refers to a "hybrid regime of security practices" (see also Coleman 2013, Avant and Haufler 2012) .
Importantly though, the more subtle and indirect ways in which transnational 'governors' (Avant et al. 2010 ) discipline contestation require more attention (Amoore and Langley 2004; Coleman and Tucker 2011 ). Coleman and Tucker use the notion to bring into view the multiple mechanisms "through which resisting subjects are both produced and reabsorbed into processes of ordering" (2011, p. 399 'Veranda' modes of disciplining dissent are indirect in a double sense: they are based on working via intermediaries -whether bureaucrats, customary authorities or 'big man' -, and chiefly rely on modes of engineering voice without recourse to physical violence (even though it is not excluded). Intermediaries may claim authority from traditional sources, from public office, or charisma and personal achievement. Indeed, attaining formal office is an important resource for extending and maintaining authority. At the same time, the personal networks and ties intermediaries rely on are often in flux and personalized (Utas 2012, 8; Terray 1986 ). In any case, they derive authority from their brokerage between 'external' actors and the subjects of Also companies that are more seriously committed to standards of CSR draw on such Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
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arrangements. Perhaps paradoxically, they may indeed be more inclined to engage in such practices as they need to demonstrate they are peacefully working with local actors.
Two caveats are due at this point. First, it is important to bear in mind that, despite the placebased metaphors of the air-conditioned office and the veranda, related technologies of disciplining dissent do not operate separately but are mutually imbricated. Second, the following analysis does not presume that attempts at disciplining are always effective. Nevertheless, in order to understand resistance more fully, it is crucial to understand its molding and entanglement with dominant regimes of transnational governance. Encouraging specific, visible dissenting practices, while ostracizing others, indeed helps producing and maintaining unequal power relations.
In the following, I draw on research on multinational mining companies and transnational schemes of resource governance from different contexts of statehood (esp. Tanzania, South Africa, DRC) to illustrate air-conditioned and veranda technologies of indirectly disciplining dissent. I posit that the findings are exemplary and relevant for extending our understanding the disciplining of dissent in transnational governance more broadly.
Air-conditioned politics -Teaching the art of disagreeing
Over the last 15 years, alongside governments and NGOs, multinational companies have come to promote notions of civil society, community participation and local ownership. In response to growing public criticism, the extractive sector has invested in air-conditioned policies and also developed voluntary principles of corporate social and security responsibility (Zerk 2006; Deitelhoff and Wolf 2010) . While the ideas, institutions and practices related to such standards may have opened up new opportunities to voice grievances, in struggles over mineral extraction they also invoked new repertoires of disciplining dissent.
Many of these repertoires are actuated through a basic distinction that mining companies and donor organizations draw: between supposedly legitimate ('constructive') and illegitimate ('obstructive', 'useless') dissent. Further illustrated below, this distinction endorses, and brings into being, certain forms of contention while discouraging others. In the words of Louiza Odysseos (2011, 439) , "dissenting conduct is channeled into 'acceptable' and 'productive' practices". Such practices are borne out empirically around sites of extraction.
The local governance of transnational resource extraction involves governments, companies, donor institutions such as DFID (the UK's Department for International Development), USAID (United States Agency for International Development) and GIZ (German Corporation for
International Cooperation), and many INGOs. They all, firstly, contend that the lack of knowledge on the side of the local population is a key obstacle to peaceful business operations. If only the Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
13 population understood mining and its operations more fully, interlocutors often told the author and her colleagues from the DRC and Tanzania to Guinea, there would be more constructive and 'useful' contestation (Hönke 2013; . This is reflected in the types of programs designed to improve resource governance. They emphasized local ownership but are nevertheless premised on the implicit assumption that local communities are unfit for modern development and its democratic politics. Therefore they would need to be educated in the 'right' Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
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forces to rigorously exclude neighboring communities from access to mineral wealth.
Community engagement through SFCG thus, at least partly, helped to contain dissent while making possible a politics of exclusion and coercive property rights protection.
Secondly, while it can be an effective strategy for NGOs to educate people on mining laws and thereby support rights-based claim-making (Frynas 2004) , such strategies promote an understanding of the law as neutral. At the least it demands the acceptance of historically specific legal frames and the attendant conditions under which claims over access to and redistribution of resources can be made. In addition to its condescension towards those protesting, such strategies depoliticize the legal framework on which mineral extraction is based. This includes the boundaries as to what counts as permissible ways of negotiating access to mineral resources. As Odysseos and Coleman have shown, rights-based agendas, interpellating dissenters as subjects of private contract, subject those negatively affected by companies to articulate "demands and responses through the idioms, vocabularies, and concerns of recognized political and legal subjectivities of citizen and rights-holder" (Odysseos 2011, 452; Coleman 2013, 177 than about or against them. This is not solely a response to monetary incentives or the threat of repression but the manifestation of a market-liberal zeitgeist in which companies are seen as part of the solution rather than the problem, and in which it has become normal for NGOs to work as subcontractors with companies. Similar to the security sector, for which Deborah Avant and as argued in more detail elsewhere (Hönke 2013 (Hönke , 2014b Rajak 2016) , fall considerably short with regard to the genuine emancipatory potential that these terms initially imply, despite the claim to empower people and catalyze popular participation in politics. The case of Impala in South Africa is particularly insightful in this respect. It is the largest platinum mining corporation in South Africa, and the traditional authority of the Royal Bafokeng is a major shareholder, which should make it a likely case for community participation.
Despite community involvement in the ownership of the corporation, however, which raised many hopes for sustainable economic activity 'under the guidance of 300,000 shareholders' (Cook 2011, 155) , a substantial lack in genuine community participation has been found, such as in developing a community development plan (Mnwana 2014, 334f) . In response to such challenges the Royal Bafokeng Authority (RBA) argued that customary kgotha kgothe meetings provided such opportunity, as these meetings are open to the entire Bafokeng community and have been celebrated as examples of direct democracy. However, these are mass meetings that do not lend themselves to the purposes of meaningful participation and community oversight.
In addition, the technical language of community development used excluded many from participating in debates about the plan so that, overall, the dominance of experts prevailed (Ibid., pp. 835-7).
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In sum, the air-conditioned politics of transnational resource extraction discipline dissent by incentivizing specific modes of contestation while containing and criminalizing others. The findings resonate with other debates in other contexts, such as Cruikshank's (1999) work in North America about how empowerment and participation have become contemporary techniques to make people govern themselves in specific ways. Much of the critical literature in IPS and elsewhere has focused on this disciplinary nature of 'air-conditioned' politics.
Transnational clientelism and veranda politics
Surprisingly little attention has been paid though to disciplining dissent by recourse to veranda politics in transnational governance. Ordering sites of transnational resource extraction also operates through veranda politics. Thus dissent is indirectly governed through multifaceted clientele arrangements.
Indeed, a clientelist logic, in its starkest form, is inherent in corporate social responsibility itself.
CSR requires beneficiaries, and benefits are distributed in specific and selective ways among groups that claim a stake in a project and its effects. As Rajak (2012, 267) pointedly argues based on research in South Africa, "practices of CSR serve to exclude large sections of society while demarcating a select target zone of responsibility (the 'community') which is bound into relations of corporate patronage and clientelism". Companies define here who is part of 'their community' and worthy to be a recipient of social investment. Others are overlooked or Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
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categorized as 'criminal' or 'illegal'. Instead of exchanging goods for votes, corporate clientelism via CSR aims at exchanging goods for peace.
The policing literature has shown how security governance has become a form of "actuarial risk management" (O'Malley 1992); a rationality of governing that emerged from the corporate sector. Consequently, governing the security of transnational (business) projects can be understood as the flexible management of risk groups and spaces adjacent to corporate sites.
Companies in Southern Katanga thus refer to surrounding communities ambiguously as both their most immediate threat as well as a potential belt of protection for operational security (Hönke 2013, 66) . Confrontations with neighboring communities have similarly become classified as a security risk by mining companies in South Africa (ibid, pp. 92-98). Consequently, Anglo Platinum presents community engagement as an investment that contributes to achieving the company's goals of stability and security.
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While there is a normative expectation that such responsibility should be organized through legitimate representatives of communities affected, the demand for strongmen (and women)
has not disappeared. A manager of Impala Mining explains: "We want communities to be organized and we want a recognized line of communication, and we have established that. But we can't deal with any Tom, Dick, and Harry." 17 Such perceptions have led to complex "alliance Forthcoming in International Political Sociology (final author's version before proofs, Nov 2017).
23 strategies" (Avant and Haufler 2012, 265-6) : transnational clientele strategies, despite and alongside 'air-conditioned' politics of participatory community engagement, persist.
A key strategy is the cooptation of local authorities. In the case of Canadian Barrick Gold, the largest mining company in Tanzania, communities affected by the companies' operations strongly claim that district commissioners have been captured by the company. Our observation of the events around official visits at the mine support these allegations. In a district in which Barrick Gold operates in Tanzania, when foreign investors or other important guests came to visit Barick Gold's operations in the Kahama district, local intermediaries organized for villagers to be available to tell them how well the company was behaving and contributed to local development. an 'air-conditioned' measure run by an independent association. However, the program ensured that donations made by individual companies for the public good were largely spent in their specific areas of operation, and their own purposes. In the case of Impala Platinum, 11 police stations, which either impact Impala Platinum directly (in the immediate surrounding communities) or indirectly (via labor-sending areas), were identified for sponsorship by the Impala Community Development Trust in 2007 (Hönke 2013, p. 94, FN 157) . In this way, the company kept orchestrating security governance and indirectly operating through selected 'client police stations' in order to secure the concession.
According to William Reno, companies are conservative forces and support and side with those in power for legal and de facto physical security (Reno 2004) . If no local intermediary is readily available, historically the practice has been to engineer an appropriate counterpart. In so doing, external governors such as companies help to invent traditions (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) that (re)produce asymmetries. I argue that companies draw on the "repertoires of domination" (Poteete und Ribot 2011 ) that become available through -often neo-traditional -arrangements to fabricating social peace. Poteete and Ribot (2011) identified a number of such repertoires, which appear hugely relevant in contemporary corporate community management via intermediaries. These include first, to control the transfer of power to participatory bodies, such as community forums. Such forums are manipulated through only bringing in people they control. Second, it includes (de)legitimating other actors, fostering dependencies, and using her further extensive patronage resources with which to engineer stability despite discontent (Geenen and Hönke 2014) . She has controlled, for instance, a range of business ventures and development projects, all contracted or funded by Banro. These allow her to benefit supporters, and to co-opt those critical of Banro through providing economic opportunity. The mwamikazi set up subcontracting company Cinamula that provides day laborers from the Luhwindja area to Banro, and has remained a majority shareholder in a subcontracting firm that built houses for families resettled by Banro. The distribution of projects funded by the corporate charity is also discussed with the mwamikazi. All of this places her in an excellent position to control the distribution of the company's social investment, and manage stability.
The ensuing relations of loyalty and dependency also served to control new channels of political participation introduced with Banro's CSR and community engagement policies. The local development committee that was put in place -as required by Banro -quickly became a 'closed shop' (Ibid. There is no point in climbing into bed with these people, thinking they are going to be there for two or three years [...] If he [local intelligence service agent] upsets his boss or for political shakedown or whatever -he could be gone tomorrow.
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His complaint was not about clientel practices as such. These he considered usual business practice. Instead, he complained about the unpredictability of veranda politics in the DRC, which rendered it more difficult to work there than elsewhere. It put at risk, in fact, the co-optation model he had been trained in, was familiar with, and used to practice.
Governing through clientelist arrangements can hence not be understood as rooted in 'traditional' African political culture that captured rational-bureaucratic transnational governance. 'External' actors, such as transnational security professionals and companies take an active part in (re)producing practices of 'veranda politics' in transnational governance.
Company agents and local intermediaries are part of historically grown transnational practice communities. Communities of practice are groups of actors which are functionally linked, repeatedly interact with each other and, in these interactions, agree on shared ways of doing things. They are "not necessarily about good or bad practices, but rather about what people happen to practice, for better or worse" (Adler 2008, 200) . As argued in more detail elsewhere (Hönke and Müller 2018) , bureaucrats and professionals of international organizations such as MNCs are part of transnational communities of practice that (re)produce heterogeneous governance practices.
Conclusion
Much attention has been rightly paid to hidden articulations of power in global governance (in IPS see recent reviews by Huysmans and Nogueira 2016, 2; Lisle 2016, 14) . This article has demonstrated that it is necessary to extend such critical analysis from the more often analyzed interventions. A broader understanding of indirect technologies of governing, and how these are globally made, is required for a critical understanding of how support is manufactured and dissent contained in transnational governance.
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